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This author examines and augments a particular aspect of Ian Barbour's well-known four-
fold typologyfor relating religion and science (conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration)
in order to clarify two options available for theology as it develops a robust view of creation in
conversation with modern science. Within integration, Barbour identifies several subtypes, in-
cluding "theology of nature." The Gifford Lectures of Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne
provide important examples of theology of nature, yet differences between their approaches re-
main unexplained within Barbour 's typology. An explanation is offered here, showing that Peacocke
and Polkinghorne employ two distinct strategies to construct a theology of nature: the strategy of
intelligibility and the strategy ofcredibility. After characterizing these strategies, the author sug-
gests that at present the relationship between them takes the form of a dilemma.
Theology has to do, not with natural
objects, but with states and movements
ol" man's spiritual life.
-Mbrecht Ritschl, 1888'
The turbulent history of the relation of
science and theology bears witness to
the impossibility of theology seeking a
peaceful haven, protected from the
science of its times...
-Arthur Peacocke, 1993^
What I want to know is whether the
strange and exciting claims of orthodox
Christianity are tenable in a scientific
age.
-John Polkinghorne, 1996'
Introduction
As part of the theological legacy of Isaac
Newton and Immanuel Kant, the question of
whether scientific knowledge of the physical
world should infonn theological reflection has
received a great deal of attention by Protes-
tant theologians in the last two centuries."*
During the nineteenth century, a dominant
approach, especially among liberal Protestants
such as Ritschl, sought to retain the integrity
of human experience over and against a
mechanistic world by distinguishing between
the realm of nature and the realm of spirit,
the latter of which was taken as humanity's
true context.'' The human person was elevated
above the realm of natural law and thus freed
from the confines of physical processes. Per-
sons were not to be thought of as objects be-
longing to the world of nature but rather, to
put it in Ritschlian terms, as citizens of the
Kingdom of God.
By ignoring the rootedness of human life
in the physical matrix of the world, theologi-
cal accounts of humanity such as Ritschl's
unfortunately, if understandably, provided an
incomplete, fractured view of creation.^ The
legacy of this kind of view remains today in
the widespread neglect of strategies for es-
tablishing connections between theological
claims and related claims from other disci-
plines, especially the sciences. Theology has
tended to react to science's mechanistic view
of the world by creating a world of its own, a
theological safe haven for reflection and re-
treat.^ However, the cost of this isolationist
strategy has not gone unnoticed.
In recent decades, a growing number of
theologians have seen the need to engage con-
temporary science in new ways rather than
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uncritically perpetuate reactions to an out-
dated, mechanistic understanding of the
world. In response to the story told by twen-
tieth-century science of the openness, novelty,
and creativity inherent in the physical world,
and of the intricate links between the natural
world and human life, theologians are return-
ing to such biblical themes as the unity of the
person and the significance of all creation
within God's puiposes.** There is a growing
sense that the question for theology is not
whether it ought to engage the sciences, but
how it should do so.
Among those who have led the call for a
reassessment of theological doctrine in light
of contemporary scientific knowledge are sci-
entist-turned-theologians Arthur Peacocke
and John Polkinghorne. Most notably in their
Gifford Lectures, Theok^gy for a Scientific
Age and Faith of a Physicist, respectively,
these two authors have embraced the task of
recasting theology in light of scientific kjiowl-
edge; and both have done so without either
wantonly abandoning traditional theological
claims or unduly submitting to the bare philo-
sophical materialism erroneously trumpeted
by some present-day apologists as the logical
entailment of modern science. As masters of
their respective scientific fields, biochemis-
try and physics, Peacocke and Polkinghorne
have helped numerous theologians and pas-
tors come to a more integrated and nuanced
view of the physical world through their sci-
entifically informed theological writings.
While each of these authors acknowledges
a certain affinity between his work and natu-
ral theology's traditional attempt to prove the
existence of God through reason and experi-
ence, their theological interests lie not in us-
ing science to prove God but rather in inte-
grating a wide range of theological and sci-
entific claims.^ In taking on this broader task,
Polkinghorne and Peacocke have each
adopted particular strategies for establishing
connections between theology and science.
This paper identifies the distinctiveness of
their strategies as well as the implications of
these strategies for the theology-and-science
dialogue.
A good place to begin talking about dif-
ferent strategies to relate theology and science
is Ian Barbour's well-known four-fold typol-
ogy, which he developed in his influential
work Religion in an Age of Science. Here he
presents a careful and detailed overview of
four approaches to relating theology and sci-
ence—conflict, independence, dialogue, and
integration.'" With regard to integration, the
view I adopt and develop here, Barbour iden-
tifies several approaches or sub-views, one of
which he calls "theology of nature. " (See fig-
ure 1 at the end of this section for the various
sub-views Barbour identifies within each of
his four main views.) In this paper, I propose
to add a further layer to Barb(iur's typology
by arguing for the thesis that although
Peacocke and Polkinghorne each work within
the integration view to develop a "theology
of nature" in their Gifford Lectures, they do
so by employing two distinct strategies: the
strategy of intelligibility (Peacocke) and the
strategy of credibility (Polkinghorne)." Thus,
although I find the term "theology of nature"
an apt characterization of the common ap-
proach found in Peacocke and Polkinghorne,
this paper focuses on several important dif-
ferences between their approaches—over is-
sues such as the Virgin Birth and the Empty
Tomb—differences which Barbour's typol-
ogy, helpful though it is, cannot explain.'- As
a means of differentiating within the term
"theology of nature," the categories intelligi-
bility and credibility clarify some of the chal-
lenges and options for theology as it seeks to
take account of contemporary scientific
knowledge."
I begin the argument by presenting the
merits of "theology of nature" in light of
Barbour's identification and comparison of
this and two other approaches to integration:
theology of nature, natural theology, and sys-
tematic synthesis. In the second section, I es-
tablish that Peacocke and Polkinghorne both
intend to develop a theology of nature in line
with Barbour's use of the term. In the third
and central section I present the strategies of
intelligibility and credibility as characteriza-
tions of Peacocke and Polkinghorne's ap-
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proaches. Here I argue that although both
strategies are loyal to theology of nature's
general concerns, each nonetheless advances
a distinct mode of reasoning. In the fourth
section I offer a preliminary assessment of the
relationship between these two strategies.
Given the virtues and risks associated with
each strategy, I characterize the relationship
In the first approach, "natural theology,"
science comes to theology's aid by describ-
ing the intricacies of natural processes such
as the development and structure of the cos-
mos given by the Big Bang cosmological sce-
nario. Here the focus rests primarily on es-
tablishing evidence for God's existence.
Darwin's theory of biological evolution dealt
a serious blow to natural theology in the nine-
teenth century by
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Figure 1. Barbour's typology for relating science and religion with
subcategories. The strategies developed in this essay, intelligibility
and credibility, function as subcategories within "theology of nature."
between them as an unresolved dilemma for
theology of nature.
I. Integration with integrity
What does it mean to integrate theologi-
cal and scientific claims, and what are the dif-
ferent possibilities for achieving integration?
In his typology, Biirbour identifies integration
with the aim of developing direct relationships
between theological doctrines and particular
scientific theories.'^ Integration seeks to ben-
efit from insights gained through "dialogue,"
the third of Barbour's options which focuses
on common interests (e.g., the well-being of
nature) and methods (e.g., the central role of
inter-subjectivity in securing knowledge).
However, integration goes beyond dialogue
in pursuit of systematic links between theol-
ogy and science. Barbour identifies three
approaches to integration.
arguing that design
in nature, which
had previously
been taken as
straightforward
evidence of God's
handiwork in the
world, was instead
the result of undi-
rected natural pro-
cesses merely mas-
querading as de-
sign—the so-called
"apparent" design
of nature. Since
Darwin, natural
theologians have
largely abandoned
arguments from
structural complex-
ity and have turned instead to the striking
properties of various forms of matter and their
associated scientific laws, such as the impor-
tance of the proton/neutron mass difference for
the development of biological life, which theo-
logians suggest point to the existence of a de-
signing mind behind the order of the universe
(the so-called fine-tuning of the universe).'-
Whether by appeal to design or fine-tuning,
Barbour rightly judges that natural theology is
of limited value to the theological enterprise
because it leaves a host of important theologi-
cal considerations untouched: the human ex-
perience of reorientation and transcendence,
the movement from brokenness to healing, and
the sense of new relationship with God and
the world."' By considering only those aspects
of reality strictly describable within the lim-
ited scope of scientific investigation, natural
theology's narrow consideration of the issue
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of God's existence makes for a poor introduc-
tion to the more complex aspects of reality such
as rehgious experience and historical revelation.
Another possibility Barbour identifies for
theology as it turns an ear toward science is
"systematic synthesis. " As the tenn suggests,
this approach integrates scientific and theo-
logical ideas into a more inclusive metaphysi-
cal system. The approach of systematic syn-
thesis relies on a particular metaphysics
(Barbour prefers process philosophy) to pro-
vide a common set of general categories for
integrating theology and science into a more
coherent vision of reality. One danger inher-
ent in this approach mentioned by Barbour is
the distortion that can result from mapping the
variety and complexity of human experience
onto an overly neat intellectual system.''' In
such cases, for example, the horror of human
suffering often tends to be trivialized through
the very act of explanation and categorization.
Equally serious, theology risks being made
into an example of a more general philosophi-
cal position. Whereas natural theology begins
with science as it stiaiggles to move from God's
existence to God's characteristics and pur-
poses, systematic synthesis starts with theol-
ogy but risks giving philosophy the last word.
Both approaches jeopardize the integrity of
theology by making theology less than an
equal participant in the conversation with sci-
ence and the quest for understanding.
Barbour uses the temi "theology of nature"
to designate the approach that strives to pre-
serve theology's disciplinary integrity while
attaining genuine interaction with science. He
defines theology of nature as "critical reflec-
tion, within a tradition based on historical rev-
elation and religious experience, in which theo-
logical beliefs concerning nature are reformu-
lated in the light of contemporary science." "*
The only dissatisfaction I have with Barbour's
definition stems from his restricting the range
of relevant theological beliefs to those "con-
cerning nature" alone. Barbour's Religion and
Science puts forward a significantly more am-
bitious agenda than simply a revised doctrine
of the natural world (and rightly so, given the
interconnected character of theological
thought), which leads me to propose the fol-
lowing modification to Barbour's definition:
theology of nature is critical reflection, within
a tradition based on historical revelation and
religious experience, in which the entire scope
of theology is up for consideration and refor-
mulation in light of contemporary science.
This broadened definition of theology of na-
ture, which I assume below, goes beyond a re-
consideration of the place of "nature" in the-
ology to include more general issues regard-
ing the task of theology in light of scientific
knowledge. Taken in this revised and expanded
form, theology of nature becomes a legitimate
and appropriate alternative to natural theology
and systematic synthesis.''' Moreover, theol-
ogy of nature brings into the discourse of the-
ology the epistemological consideration of
theology's relation to other disciplines and
modes of knowledge, a topic which has often
been ignored or viewed as preliminary to the
theological task.
Theology of nature, unlike natural theol-
ogy, brings a "full wealth of conviction" to
the conversation with science, even as it is
amenable to being reshaped through a criti-
cal engagement with what science has to say
about the world.-" Theology of nature also
need not be unappreciative of the clarity that
comes with clear philosophfcal concepts, but
it resists being subsumed into a more general
philosophical system—it begins not with gen-
eral categories, but with the particulars of
Christian revelation and experience. From
this starting point, theology of nature moves
outward to engage claims from other disci-
plines (as well as other religions) about the
world. As an approach to integration, theol-
ogy of nature thus occupies a mediating posi-
tion between the more scientifically driven ap-
proach of natural theology and the more philo-
sophically oriented approach of systematic
synthesis. This approach is, thus, well suited
to the task of engaging science while main-
taining the integrity of theological claims.
Having put forward this understanding, I turn
now to Peacocke's and Polkinghome's Gifford
Lectures and argue that both merit the desig-
nation, "theology of nature."
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II. Two theologians, one approach
Theology of nature, as Barbour has devel-
oped it and I have presented it above, suggests
five broad themes or concerns that shape the
underlying structure of a scientifically infonned
theology. These relate to ( 1 ) scientific meth-
ods, (2) scientific accounts of the world, (3)
views of reality, (4) the God-world relationship,
and (5) the integrity of creation. In this sec-
tion, I develop these five themes and show that
they do, in fact, characterize the basic thrust of
the proposals put forward by Peacocke and
Polkinghorne in their respective Gifford Lec-
tures. In the section following this one, I will
revisit each theme, but with the opposite task
of highlighting several important differences
between Peacocke and Polkinghorne's work
—
differences that I will explain in temis of the
strategies of intelligibility and credibility.
The first integral theme for theology of na-
ture is a detailed investigation of scientific
methods that does not assmne theology must
adopt a thoroughly "scientific" mien. On the
one hand, theology of nature is eager to under-
stand the means b\ which science so success-
fully garners knowledge of certain aspects of
reality and to discern ways in which it can learn
from science's success. This desire on
theology's part to engage
other ways of knowing
has been encouraged in
recent decades by the
ongoing discussion
within the philosophy of
science about the limits
as well as the informal
character of the scien-
tific method.-' On the
other hand, theology ot
nature will resist a
scientistic attitude (latent B
in some versions of natu-
ral theology) that takes science to be the only
sure way to knowledge. Openness to method-
ological insights from science need not result
in theology relinquishing the methodological
wisdom of its own heritage. According to
Polkinghorne, such an approach attempts "to
do justice to the idiosyncracy of the discipline
[of theology], while at the same time assimi-
lating it to many other fomis of human ratio-
nal inquiry, including science"; in Peacocke's
words, theology "needs to be consonant and
coherent with, though far from being derived
from, scientific perspectives on the world."^^
Theology of nature will also resist ceding too
much control to any philosophical system, al-
though it gratefully acknowledges any con-
ceptual clarity philosophy has to offer regard-
ing specific concepts or issues. Both Peacocke
and Polkinghorne endorse this attitude toward
philosophy and draw a fimi distinction be-
tween philosophical theism's abstract concep-
tion of God and the Christian doctrine of God
grounded in the life, death, and resurrection
of Jesus Christ. Theology of nature brings to
the discussion the full particularity and wealth
of its methods and claims even when, through
the course of discussion, it becomes clear that
certain doctrines must be refomiulated or even
abandoned.
The incorporation of scientific accounts
of the world into theology by engaging
science's best-established concepts and theo-
ries constitutes the second integral theme for
theology of nature. At this level, theology's
desire to expose itself to science moves be-
By considering only those aspects of reality
strictly describable within the limited scope of
scientific investigation, natural theology's
narrow consideration of the issue of God's
existence makes for a poor introduction to the
more complex aspects of reality such as
religious experience and historical revelation.
yond the realm of method and into the realm
of scientific theory and theological doctrine.
Peacocke expresses the task as follows:
...to evolve a theology that has been
refined... in the fires of the new
perceptions of the world thai the natural
sciences have irreversibly established.-'
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Polkinghorne, too, articulates his desire for
more than peripheral contact when he says:
I am convinced that the discussion must
not just be on the frontier between
science and theology, but must
penetrate as deeply as possible into
their heartlands.-'*
From Big Bang cosmology and evolutionary
biology to cognitive neuroscience and genetics,
theology of nature takes stock of the full range
of recent scientific developments and discover-
ies when reconsidering the content and relations
of the doctrines of God, creation, anthropology,
evil, incarnation, salvation, eschatology—in-
deed, the entire theological agenda.-^
The articulation of a rich, dijferentiated
view ofreality which simultaneously avoids a
dualist view of creation marks the third inte-
gral theme for theology of nature. Here, the-
ology takes its stand against reductionist views
of the world which aim to strip the human
spirit and human experience of their causal
powers by labeling them as mere epiphenom-
ena riding on top of what are taken to be the
actual ontological and causal structures of
As an approach to integration, theology of
nature occupies a mediating position between
the more scientifically driven approach of
natural theology and the more philosophi-
cally oriented approach of systematic synthe-
sis. This approach is, thus, well suited to the
task of engaging science while maintaining
the integrity of theological claims.
reality (subatomic particles, fields, and the
like), as well as against dualist views which
attempt to preserve the causal and theologi-
cal integrity of human experience by positing
a realm of reality, the realm of the spirit, which
is separate from the physical world. Chart-
ing a course between reductionism and dual-
ism, theology of nature brings to the table its
own "data" about the world—what Peacocke
calls a tradition's '"accumulated wisdom"-''
—
including the notion and content of revelation.
Given the amount of space Peacocke and
Polkinghorne devote to discrediting reduc-
tionism, one could fairly say they count it
among theology's most pressing tasks.
Polkinghorne devotes the entire first chapter
of Faith of a Physicist, entitled "Humanity,"
to developing a view of reality which makes
room for mind and spirit as actors in the world,
thus setting the stage for subsequent theologi-
cal discussion. Polkinghorne 's term for his
own view, "dual-aspect monism," denotes a
unified creation which is nonetheless differ-
entiated into two states or phases, the mate-
rial and the mental. Peacocke makes a some-
what different argument against reductionist
claims (more on the difference later), but with
similar intentions. He develops a multi-lay-
ered view of reality, arguing as follows:
[T|hcre is no sense in which subatomic
particles are to be graded as 'more real'
than, say, a bacterial ceil or a human
person or a social fact.-^
The richly differentiated human experience of
reality, in other words, is a key to the way the
world really is. To use
Polkinghorne 's expres-
sion, "epistemology
models ontology."-** Or
as Peacocke puts it,
there are good grounds
for "believing that what
is real is what the vari-
ous levels of [our] de-
scription |of reality] ac-
tually refer to." -'' For
both Peacocke and
Polkinghorne, the
nonreducibility of the
i levels of description we
employ implies the impossibility of reducing
reality to the constituents of any particular
level. Instead, reality must be richly differen-
tiated. At the same time, both affimi the bibli-
cal view of the psychosomatic unity of the per-
son and assert that theology must reshape its
concept of personhood in accordance with the
view that persons are entirely pail of the physi-
cal world, even though experiences of transcen-
dence are a defining feature of human life.^"
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The fourth theme central to theology of
nature involves embracing the idea of God's
experiencing and suffering with creation in
light of the profoundly temporal character of
the universe unveiled by contemporary sci-
ence. As Barbour indicates, our growing ap-
preciation of the genuinely changing world
around us cannot but shape theology because
"our understanding of the general character-
istics of nature will affect our models of God's
relation to nature."^' Peacocke and
Polkinghorne both respond to the contempo-
rary scientific account of novelty in the world,
with its intricate mixture of chance and law.
by rethinking the relationship of God to the
world in strikingly temporal ternis. For each
author, God's intimate involvement with the
world demands a radical reassertion of divine
temporality, even to the point of limiting di-
vine knowledge of the future in light of the
world's thoroughgoing temporal character. '-
Each draws on the idea of God's self-limita-
tion as a way of understanding not only the
world's existence but also its (limited) abil-
ity to "make itself." Furthermore, each uses
the notion of God's temporal experience of
the world as a stepping stone to discuss what
is arguably a defining interest of late twenti-
eth-century theology: the suffering of God
in and with the world.''' If God is temporal,
then God shares in the experience of the
world, including experiences of suffering. A
temporal God suffers with a suffering cre-
ation. Polkinghorne develops this idea by
arguing for the compatibility of divine suf-
fering with divine power. He sees in God's
choice to suffer the basis of hope for the
world's future through the redemption of suf-
fering itself."
The affirmation of the integrity of the en-
tire universe in relation to God's purposes
constitutes theology of nature's fifth integral
theme. The cosmos, this theme affirms, is
God's creation. Barbour clearly expresses
how crucial it is for theology of nature to re-
deem and replace the destiuctive legacy of the
traditional, anthropocentric model of human
domination over the rest of creation with a
more positive view that values the physical
world beyond its utility for human purposes.
Along with the biblical theme of the steward-
ship of nature, Barbour advocates a strongly
sacramental view in which God is present in
and under all creation." It is important to high-
light what this theme implicitly affirms,
namely, that when theological references are
made to the "'world" as God's creation, the
scope must be broadened to include not only
Earth but the solar system, the galaxy, and
even the entire universe. Theologians must
unlearn "world" and "Earth" as synonyms.
Evolutionary biology, astronomy, and cosmol-
ogy all point to the dynamic and evolving
character of the universe, reminding us that
the universe as a whole is rightly viewed as
God's ongoing creation. In his discussion of
revelation, Peacocke argues that what we ex-
perience as God's revelation is only a particu-
larly intense form of God's presence which
exi.sts at all times and all places in the uni-
verse. ""' He sees the incarnation as a disclo-
sure of the general meaning and "consumma-
tit)n of the creative and creating evolutionary
process" as a whole. ^'' Theology, for Peacocke,
should therefore be "regarded as an explora-
tion of the ultimate meaning of all levels,"
which comes into focus in the Christ-event.'**
Similarly, Polkinghorne uses his dual-aspect
monistic view of the universe to guard against
the idea that God was less involved in cre-
ation prior to the emergence of conscious be-
ings.'^ He concurs with Barbour's view that
science can help us learn to value the world
apart from its utility for our purposes, and
when he declares that "the destiny of human-
ity and the destiny of the universe are together
to find their fulfilment in a liberation from
decay and futility,"^' he echoes Paul's view
in Romans 8.
These five themes provide theology of
nature with its basic shape. They encourage
theological consideration of scientific meth-
ods as well as concepts and theories. Even
more fundamentally, they promote a reas-
sessment of the entire spectrum of theologi-
cal considerations in light of science. From
this examination of Peacocke and
Polkinghorne, both can be seen to engage
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the methods and theories of science as they
develop their theological proposals. Each
takes an integrative view of theology's task
vis-a-vis science and brings to this task con-
cerns which distinguish theology of nature
from Barbour's other integrationist ap-
proaches. Having identified Peacocke and
Polkinghorne's common approach under
the banner "theology of nature," I now turn
to several important differences in their
work which are not explained by this shared
approach.
III. One approach, two strategies
It is my central claim in this paper that
the strategies of intelligibility and credibility
represent two strikingly different strategies for
crafting a theology of nature. As such, they
stand in close conceptual proximity to one
another. The terms might, at first glance, even
appear indistinguishable. With the help of
Peacocke and Polkinghorne, however, each
strategy can be seen to give unique emphasis
to the key themes developed in the previous
section. First, I need to present definitions of
these two strategies.
The strategy of intelligibility develops a
theology of nature by placing scientific ac-
counts of the world in an overall context
through an appeal to relevant theological
When theological references are made to
the '^world'^ as God's creation, the scope
must he broadened to include not only
Earth but the solar system, the galaxy, even
the entire universe. Theologians must
unlearn ''world'' and ''Earth" as synonyms.
concepts, thereby extending the meaning of
these scientific accounts to the most compre-
hensive level. Intelligibility, in this sense, in-
volves making the broadest possible sense of
experience."*' As a strategy, it aims for more
than merely a notional understanding of the
world as a purposeful unity. According to
Peacocke,
[The scientific quest for] intelligibility
concerning the nature and origin of the
cosmos has plunged human beings...
into the darker stream of the search for
meaning.^-^
The strategy of intelligibility endeavors to
offer a deep, satisfying account of the mean-
ing and purpose of the world and humanity
as God's creation. In order to give mean-
ing to human experience, this strategy em-
ploys a theological framework to support
and contextualize scientific descriptions of
the world's processes and structures. Ac-
cordingly, the strategy begins with scien-
tific accounts of the world and shifts to theo-
logical interpretation via questions raised
by science but which remain unanswerable
within science itself: so-called "limit ques-
tions." The strategy of intelligibility, in
short, appeals to theology to render the
world intelligible. It is important to note
that this strategy is radically different from
natural theology's strategy of using the
world to render God probable. Tliis crucial
difference makes intelligibility an important
strategy for theology of nature.
In contrast to intelligibility, the stiategy of
credibility develops a theology of nature by es-
tablishing the tenability oftheological claims
in light of what science shows us about the
breadth, depth, and lim-
its ofhuman rationality.
Credibility, understood
in this way, involves es-
tablishing resources for
rationally motivated be-
lief. This strategy pri-
marily draws from
science's account of the
world a picture of hu-
man rationality which
allows for, even validates, theological claims
and styles of argumentation. In
Polkinghorne's words, the strategy of cred-
ibility presents an explanation (i. e., warrant
or motivation) for religious belief
...comparable to the kind of explana-
tion one might offer of one's conviction
that matter is composed of quarks and
gluons and electrons.''^
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It is not that Polkinghorne lacks interest in
science's actual account of the world—far
from it—but rather that he finds equally in-
teresting, even more illuminating, the episte-
mological lessons science offers regarding the
"how" and "why" of our beliefs about God
and Creation. The strategy of credibility, in
short, appeals to science to render God cred-
ible. As a strategy, it too differs markedly from
that of natural theology. Instead of setting its
sights on proving the existence of God, it en-
deavors to motivate, deepen, secure, and in-
evitably refine existing belief in God in light
of what is known about how the world has
come to be apprehended through science.
Theology of nature has (at least) these two
strategies available to it: ( 1 ) to employ theol-
ogy to extend the intelligibility of world as
we know it through science, and (2) to em-
ploy the epistemological lessons of science
to strengthen the credibility of theological
claims about God, humanity, and the cosmos.
With these definitions in hand, the differences
between Peacocke and Polkinghorne begin to
appear more clearly. A quick review of the
epigraphs at the beginning of this paper will
perhaps now yield not only a sense of the dis-
tance between Ritschl's concerns and those
of Peacocke and Polkinghorne, but also an
increased appreciation for the differences be-
tween a theology that intends to make "the
science of its times" intelligible and one that
intends to establish the credibility of the
"strange and exciting" claims of theology in
light of science. Several specific examples
of Peacocke and Polkinghorne 's implemen-
tation of these strategies paralleling the themes
of the previous section will help to shed fur-
ther light on their differences.
Peacocke and Polkinghorne have similar
views of the way science works—both are in-
fluenced by (and express similar reservations
about more constructivist versions of) recent
work in the philosophy and history of sci-
ence—and yet each casts the methodological
import of science in strikingly different lan-
guage. For Peacocke, "theology, like any
other human inquiry into the nature of real-
ity, must use the same general criteria of rea-
sonableness as, say, science itself." ^^ Among
the criteria he lists are: fit with data, internal
coherence, comprehensiveness, cogency, sim-
plicity, fruitfulness, and (for theology) giving
meaning for personal existence. Theology,
says Peacocke, "cannot avoid running the
gauntlet of these criteria of reasonablness. . ."
^^ His is by no means a positivist view of sci-
ence, and yet he insists that theology strictly
adhere to a set of general criteria in order to
contribute to the quest for intelligibility.^^
Polkinghorne, on the other hand, focuses on
the richness of human rationality by pointing
repeatedly to parallels and analogies between
scientific and theological methods regarding
issues such as the role of unique events in
advancing knowledge, the necessity of
complementarity as a tool ft)r describing re-
ality, the place of dynamism in the being of
God and creation, the difficulty of theory
choice in the absence of crucial experiments,
and the need for "corrigible boldness" in both
cosmology and New Testament studies.^^ Al-
though one might think Polkinghorne's pro-
fessed "bottom-up" scientific approach to the-
ology would be compatible with Peacocke's
concern to establish general criteria of rea-
sonableness, Polkinghorne is in fact more
concerned to ensure continuous contact be-
tween theology and the details of human ex-
perience than he is to confine theology inside
any sharply defined methodological bound-
ary.^** Thus, while the strategy of intelligibil-
ity is to demand that theology meet various
general criteria of rationality, the strategy of
credibility is to develop a view of rationality
rich enough to encompass theological patterns
of thought and broad enough to reveal paral-
lels between theological and scientific modes
of reasoning.
Peacocke and Polkinghorne are notably
divided over the implications of scientific
knowledge concerning biological reproduc-
tion for the theological issue of the Virgin
Birth, or more precisely stated, the issue of
Jesus' virginal conception. According to
Peacocke, for Jesus to have been "fully hu-
man" he must have had a human father. Bio-
logical science tells us that without a Y chro-
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mosome—which only males can pass on, and
which only they inherit—Jesus would not
have been be)ni male. Jesus, like all men, must
therefore have inherited a Y chromosome
from a human father.^'' If theology is to make
sense of the special character of the person of
Jesus by appealing to the notion of incarna-
tion, Peacocke contends that it will have to
do so within the confines of our understand-
ing of biological reproduction. Although
Polkinghorne alludes to the difficulty posed
by the issues Peacocke raises for a bottom-up
thinker like himself, he nonetheless defends
the Virgin Birth on the basis of scriptural con-
siderations together with the "symbolic ap-
propriateness of the fusion of divine initia-
tive and human co-operation." "' Thus, al-
though both authors acknowledge the relevant
scientific issues, Peacocke insists that if the-
ology is to contribute to the intelligibility of
the Virgin Birth, it must play the hand it has
been dealt by science, while Polkinghorne
defends the credibility of the nanative, even
though it appears to be a biological impossi-
bility.
In spite of the fact that both Peacocke and
Polkinghorne articulate a rich, differentiated
view of reality, they have strikingly different
views of the human person, which reflect their
different theological strategies as much as
their commonly held anti-reductionist convic-
tions. Peacocke, for instance, develops a de-
tailed hierarchy of reality (with correspond-
ing sciences) as part of his argument against
a dualistic view of the human person and for
a view of the person as a "microcosm" of the
multi-leveled, but thoroughly physical, "mac-
rocosm."'" Peacocke 's claim that human be-
ings are made of the very stuff of the world
undergirds his idea that God's interaction with
humanity is only a more intense fomi of God's
interaction with the world in general.
"
Polkinghorne, on the other hand, is more con-
cerned to construct a metaphysical view that
includes from the outset realities such as men-
tality and free will. His own "ample and
many-valued view of human nature" builds
on his discussion of the ideas of
complementarity and openness, which, he ar-
gues, point to a world of becoming in which
"there are opportunities for the action of causal
principles, other than the merely mechanical
interaction of parts.'"*' Whereas Peacocke pre-
sumes the sufficiency of known natural pro-
cesses to explain personhood, Polkinghorne
suggests a degree of novelty and receptivity
in nature beyond what science can presently
describe. By appealing to processes not within
the reach of current science, Polkinghorne
argues for the credibility of a more traditional
theological anthropology on the basis of the
continual advance (and abandonment) of sci-
entific theories. Peacocke, on the other hand,
takes the best available science as a relatively
adequate account of persons within which
theology must operate as it attempts to make
the concept of personhood intelligible.
A key point of difference between
Peacocke and Polkinghorne lies in their esti-
mation of God's relation to the world.
Peacocke argues for a panentheistic view:
[Tjhe processes revealed by the
sciences are in themselves God acting
as Creator. . . God is not lo be found as
some kind oi additional factor added on
to the processes of the world.'^
God, in Peacocke's panentheistic view, is (but
is not limited to) the world considered at its
most comprehensive level. Because God is
natural processes acting in themselves, these
processes are rendered amenable to meaning
and purpose; that is, they can be made intelli-
gible. By contrast, Polkinghorne describes
the relation between God and the world in
more traditionally theistic terms. Although
he accepts a kind of eschatological
panentheism, he calls the regularities of na-
ture at best a "pale reflection of the faithful-
ness of the Creator" and is unsatisfied with
Peacocke's equating natural processes with
God's action. "^"^ Instead, he prefers to reshape
the traditional view of divine action by inter-
preting novelty and change in nature as a con-
sequence of God's allowing creation to be it-
self. Rather than making natural processes
intelligible by equating them with God's ac-
tion, Polkinghorne attempts to present a cred-
ible version of God fulfilling the divine pur-
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poses in the world by blending the idea of God
allowing nature to develop under its own in-
tegrity with the idea of God working in and
through nature's openness.
Perhaps one of the most striking differ-
ences between Peacocke and Polkinghorne
centers on their disparate views of the rela-
tion of the "Empty Tomb" to the resurrection.
Given Peacocke 's view that theology must
confonn to the standards of rationality adhered
to by science, it is not surprising that he pre-
fers to remain agnostic about the empty tomb,
arguing instead for a notion of resurrection
that does not dispute the finality of biological
death. In light of the loss of continuity that
accompanies death, through the decay and dis-
persal of the body's molecules. Peacocke ar-
gues that resurrection should be understood
as a re-creation or transformation that does
not depend upon bodily continuity."^'' He opts
to make the notion of death and a "victory
over death" intelligible by developing his in-
terpretation of resurrection independent of any
consideration of physical transformation. Ac-
cording to Peacocke, Jesus' resurrection can
be relevant to us—as beings whose bodies dis-
perse upon death and eventually contribute
to future life, even human life—only if we
can be resurrected in the same manner as Jesus
was. If Jesus' resurrec- g
tion depended on the
transformation of his
physical body before
decay had set in, an "in-
superable, logical gulf
lies between us and
him." Peacocke argues
that resurrection cannot
depend upon bodily
continuity and must, for
Jesus and for us, consti-
tute a "/r-creation into
a new mode of existence." ^^ For
Polkinghorne, the empty tomb of the resur-
rection proleptically announces the common
eschatological destiny of humanity and all
creation."^" Although theology has, over the
centuries, been rather ambiguous about
nature's place in the consummation of cre-
ation,''" Polkinghorne offers an account of
Christian hope that establishes the credibility
of the traditional theological claim of bodily
resurrection by linking the transfomied ma-
teriality of the resurrected Christ to the mate-
riality of all creation. Peacocke, as I have
shown, retreats from the traditional claim of
bodily resurrection in his choice to situate the
irreversible finality of physical death within
the context of hope in God's ultimate affir-
mation of personhood.
Other examples could be adduced as well,
but these five suffice to establish my claim that
although Peacocke and Polkinghorne share a
set of concerns that motivate their interest in
theology of nature, they have strikingly differ-
ent strategies for pursuing their work. Within
Peacocke's strategy of intelligibility, the meth-
ods and ideas of science act as a tether on theo-
logical claims. One does occasionally find him
employing the limits of science in support of
theological claims, as in this remark:
[Ujltimate ineffability in the nature of
the divine parallels... our ullimate
inability to say what even things and
persons are in themselves.'''
In general, however, he emphasizes the con-
straining role of science upon theology.
Polkinghorne 's strategy of credibility allows
theology considerably more room to maneu-
Peacocke insists that if theology is to
contribute to the intelligibility of the Virgin
Birth, it must play the hand it has been
dealt by science, while Polkinghorne
defends the credibility of the narrative,
even though it appears to be a biological
impossibility.
ver. His willingness to portray not only the
strengths of the scientific method but also its
limits yields a broader concept of human ra-
tionality designed to accommodate and sup-
port a wider range of theological claims. Sig-
nificantly, Polkinghorne himself makes the
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following comment about the relation between
his own approach and that of Peacocke:
At issue [between Peacocke and
myself] is the degree to which scientific
concepts should be allowed to mould
and intluence the conceptual apparatus
of theological thought, and the degree
to which theology must retain (as
science does unquestioned) its own
portfolio of irreducibly necessary
ideas.''-
This is precisely the issue I have developed
through my discussion of the strategies of in-
telligibility and credibility.
IV. Theology of nature's dilemma
In my argument that Peacocke and
Polkinghorne employ distinct strategies for
developing a theology
of nature, two notice-
ably different ways of
understanding what it
means to "take science
into account" have
emerged. According
to the strategy of intel-
ligibility, theology
ought to focus prima-
rily on the actual de-
tails of scientific ac-
counts of the world
(scientific concepts and theories) and adjust
itself accordingly, in order to participate fully
in the human quest for meaning. On this ac-
count, theology should place heavy emphasis
on incorporating scientific accounts of the
world—the second theme of a theology of
nature—and allow science to act as a con-
straint upon theology, pruning concepts and
doctrines according to their congruence with
scientific description. In contrast, credibility
emphasizes detailed investigation of scientific
methods (the first theme of a theology of na-
ture) in order to equip theology with a more
nuanced understanding of the inner workings
of science and of the rich resources of human
rationality, and thus to embolden theology in
its defense of theological claims. On this ac-
count, science is understood to offer support
to theology by contributing to a better under-
standing of the breadth and depth of human
rationality and its capacity to encompass and
sustain theological reasoning. Having pre-
sented my argument, I now want briefly to
explore the relation between these two strate-
gies. The obvious tension between them leads
to the question of whether it is possible to de-
cide which strategy is preferable. Ought one
strategy be chosen over the other? And what
considerations might enter into such a deci-
sion?
I propose dubbing the tension between
these two strategies the "science dilemma,"
because, in fact, science itself puMs theology
of nature in both directions. Or put more pre-
cisely, actual scientific accounts of the com-
plex and interconnected world seem to encour-
Shoiild theologians attempt to restructure
theology along lines more consonant with
scientific viewSy or should they resist such
consonance^ knowing that science^ prop-
erly chastenedy is not capable of vetoing
theological claims^ no matter how unlikely
or strange?
age theological engagement, while careful
examination of the processes of science (pro-
vided by recent philosophy of science) sug-
gests that theology is justified in adopting a
critical, self-confident, even self-reliant, atti-
tude towiu^d science and its description of the
world. For any given point of apparent con-
flict between theological and scientific ac-
counts of the world, the dilemma immediately
appears: should a particular theological con-
cept or doctrine such as physical resurrection
be reinterpreted, revised, or abandoned in light
of scientific knowledge, or should theology
resist the implications of the relevant scien-
tific account? More generally, should theo-
logians attempt to restructure theology along
lines more consonant with scientific views,
or should they resist such consonance, know-
ing that science, properly chastened, is not
capable of vetoing theological claims, no
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matter how unlikely or strange? What crite-
ria might help in deciding between these two
strategies? The historical irony here is that
while numerous scientific developments of
the twentieth century have stimulated a de-
sire among theologians for bridge-building
—
in ways that would have been unthinkable for
Ritschl—the methodological tools carefully
assembled by theologians for entering into
dialogue with the sciences have often seemed
better suited for constructing observation tow-
ers than for building bridges."
Furthermore, these two strategies present
a dilemma for theology of nature rather than
a straightforward choice because when taken
individually, each strategy comes with con-
siderable risks. While the strategy of intelli-
gibility "plays fair" with scientific accounts
of the world by allowing science to constrain
theology, uncritical acceptance of this strat-
egy hazards a theological capitulation to sci-
ence that would ultimately disallow theology
its central claims (such as physical resurrec-
tion). The strategy of credibility, on the other
hand, correctly points us to a broader notion
of human rationality, but a wholehearted
embrace of this strategy raises the possibility
of unduly immunizing theology against
science's ability to safeguard our fallible
epistemic endeavors from untethered conjec-
ture (regarding, for example, the Virgin
Birth ).''^ The tension between these two strat-
egies resists easy resolution. As a result, to-
gether they pose a genuine dilemma for the
construction of a theology of nature.
Is there somewhere to turn for help in re-
solving this dilemma? Fortunately, a good
deal has been written on the relation between
science and theology in recent decades. To
name only some of the more prominent fig-
ures who have written on this subject, I would
mention Michael Banner, Ian Barbour, Philip
Clayton, Niels Gregersen, Sallie McFague,
Alister McGrath, Nancey Murphy, Wolfhart
Pannenberg, Wentzel van Huyssteen, and
Mikael Stenmark. Might these authors pro-
vide a way out of the science dilemma? I
believe the answer is, unfortunately, no,
though some have more to offer than others.
In spite of the diversity of views and ap-
proaches taken by these authors, none offers
an entirely satisfactory solution to the prob-
lem. Although it is beyond the scope of my
argument in this paper to warrant this claim
in detail, a brief summary will suffice to show
why I believe these authors do not provide a
solution to the science dilemma.
Much recent writing on the relationship
between science and theology has tiiken the
form of investigating the developments of
twentieth-century philosophy of science, and
then applying these developments to the is-
sue of theological method. Given the diffi-
cult situation theologians faced in the middle
of the twentieth century regarding the cogni-
tive status of their claims, this was no doubt
the best place to begin. The downfall during
this period of the logical positivist paradigm
of knowledge, which had reigned supreme
during the early part of the twentieth century
and which condemned theology outright as
non-empirical and thus meaningless, meant
that the most pressing task with regard to the
relationship between theology and science
was to marshal resources for reclaiming the
integrity of religious belief and theological
rationality. Two examples of this approach
include early works by Barbour and
Pannenberg.'''^ Although each of these authors
elsewhere engages the actual findings of sci-
ence,'''' neither included in their discussion of
the methodological characteristics and rela-
tionships of theology and science anything
that might shed light on the science dilemma.
Pannenberg, for example, in his magisterial
Theology and the Philosophy ofScience, dealt
at length with the question of whether theol-
ogy can be called a science, but nowhere at-
tempted to develop a set of principles for clari-
fying whether or how theology should incor-
porate knowledge from the sciences.
Barbour's discussion of the philosophy of sci-
ence in Myths, Models, and Paradigms de-
fended the referential character of religious
language in light of recent philosophy of sci-
ence, but did not go on to provide any sort of
framework for enabling the critical interac-
tion of scientific and theological concepts.
The Boston Theological Institute 253
Building on Barbour and Pannenberg's
early insights, others have followed a similar
pattern in discussing the methodological re-
lations between science and theology: intro-
duce the thesis that theology "must take sci-
ence seriously," but then develop it by argu-
ing for the explanatory power and integrity
of theology based upon a careful and critical
interpretation of philosophy of science with-
out any detailed discussion of how theology
should critically engage the concepts and theo-
ries of science. Banner, for example, meticu-
lously reviews developments in twentieth-
century philosophy of science in iirguing for
the existence of parallels between scientific
and theological methodology.*''' Clayton, fol-
lowing Pannenberg, focuses on the mediat-
ing role of the social sciences by constructing
an epistemological continuum that would link
types of knowing found in the physical sci-
ences and theology.'''* McFague's insightful
examination of the role of metaphor in theol-
ogy draws on the place of metaphor in scien-
tific discourse, but her work is largely devoid
of reference to actual scientific accounts.*'''
Similarly, van Huyssteen focuses in his early
work on the quest for "epistemological cred-
ibility," through a careful discussion of phi-
losophy of science; but he offers few refer-
ences to actual scientific theories.^" Nancey
Murphy's discussion of theology's options for
interacting with science mentions two strate-
gies similar to those I have here designated
as the science dilemma: ( 1 ) hybridization re-
sulting from the incoiporation of scientific
theories into theological formulations, and (2)
competition resulting from theology present-
ing its own view (e.g., of religious experience)
as an alternative to a secular scientific account
of the same phenomenon—but, again, she puts
forwiird no criteria for considering what might
make one option more appropriate than the
other.^' In a more recent contribution—which,
disappointingly, breaks little new method-
ological ground—McGrath looks for points
of methodological divergence as well as con-
vergence, but concludes minimally that be-
lief in God can be maintained in light of what
science tells us (e.g., about the place of evil
and suffering in the world).''- Stenmark's re-
cent helpful discussion of rationality in light
of the epistemic limits encountered in every-
day life likewise offers no insight for discern-
ing how theological beliefs should be con-
strained by science, beyond arguing that all
belief should remain open to criticism."
Gregersen, too, has no answer to the science
dilemma; but he does at least lay hold of its
basic structure:
[T]heology always runs the double risk
of either conllating theological and
scientific language or of prematurely
putting barriers to the coherence
process.^"*
Despite much careful reflection and impor-
tant insight into the relation between science
and theology, none of the works mentioned
above manages to go beyond an initial call
for critical dialogue.
Nonetheless, this body of literature has
succeeded in taking what must be considered
a crucial step toward re-establishing connec-
tions from theology to science. The impor-
tance of these authors' insights regarding the
philosophy of science vis-a-vis theology can-
not be overestimated, especially in light of
logical positivism's previous dismissal of the-
ology, and neo-orthodoxy's subsequent refusal
to engage science at all. And yet, in spite of
this genuine advance, no set of criteria has
appeared for deciding when theology should
undertake to revise its claims in light of sci-
ence and when it ought to resist such intru-
sions—the dilemma remains.
In light of the fluid nature of both theol-
ogy and science, is it even feasible to ask for
criteria for a critical theological appropriation
of science? Granted, the task of exploring
the degree to which science and theology
—
both living and changing traditions—share a
common or analogous epistemology and draw
from the same resources of human rationality
is never finished. Nonetheless, theology's
engagement with scientific concepts and theo-
ries cannot be postponed in anticipation of a
definitive methodological account of their
processes and relationship. Theology in the
past has made better and worse assumptions
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about the physical world, and it will continue
to adopt a particular working understanding
of the processes and constituents of the world.
If theologians cannot avoid the difficult task
of responsibly appropriating scientific insights
into theology, perhaps it is wise to see if re-
cent insights can be leveraged in order to
clarify what "responsibly" means.
In this regard, it is helpful to revisit the
work of Philip Clayton, who in his Explana-
tionfrom Physics to Theology asks what might
count against theological assertions that ap-
pear to contain empirical claims, but which
may not be immediately testable (e.g., the res-
urrection). Clayton lists three criteria: (1)
internal contradiction, (2) empirical predic-
tions that are falsified, and (3) tension between
a theological assertion and the corresponding
natural explanation.^"^ Clearly, the second cri-
terion appears to be a remote possibility for
theology in most cases, but this may be an
area in which theology should endeavor to
adopt a more "scientific" character (depend-
ing, of course, on whether one opts for a more
redescriptive vl^-w of theology, such as
Gregersen's, or a more boldly predictive one,
such as Murphy's). With regard to (3), unfor-
tunately Clayton does not describe in detail
the degree or kind of
tension that would
count against a theo-
logical assertion. He
does, however, make
the important observa-
tion that religious be-
liefs can never be evalu-
ated individually, given
the contextual con-
straints and demands inherent in theology.^''
In his most recent work, God and Con-
temporary Science, Clayton provides a more
sustained answer to the question of what it
means to take science seriously. Like
Gregersen, he has a basic grasp of the sci-
ence dilemma: the relevant theological goal,
he says, is to develop a theology constrained,
but not dictated by science." He suggests
several criteria for a responsible theological
engagement with science: (1) openness to
scientific results and the directions they point,
(2) willingness to wrestle with tendencies that
run counter to traditional theological answers,
and (3 ) openness to revising dearly held theo-
logical conclusions. He goes on to specify
two options for theology when faced with the
task of rejecting the apparent implications of
science: either (4) search for other reasons
inherent within the sciences themselves to
support the theological claim,^** or (5) locate
reasons that might be convincing from other
fields such as history, ethics, or philosophy.
Finally, he adds (6) the obligation to avoid
misusing science by attempting to "prove"
theological claims which ultimately must be
judged on the basis of their theological ad-
equacy (which will include, but not be lim-
ited to, taking their congruence with science
into account)."
What should be made of Clayton's ap-
proach in relation to the present concern?
While his criteria are helpful in evoking the
attitude that theology of nature must hold to-
ward science, and while he elucidates options
for theology of nature if it chooses to remain
in tension with science, the issue of whether
to adopt or resist a particular scientific con-
cept or theory remains hidden in the move-
The central challenge for theology of
nature is to avoid either inappropriately
resisting science when it should be em-
braced, or inappropriately embracing
science when it ought to be resisted.
ment from criterion (3) to (4). In fact, Clayton
thinks that an informed understanding of sci-
entific conundrums and limits points to the
need for a broader metaphysical discourse, a
common framework for formulating agree-
ments and disagreements, without which no
further clarification can be attained on this
issue. Having developed in this paper two
strategies for theology of nature, which as an
approach to integration explicitly rejects the
idea of a relying upon a broader philosophi-
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cal schema, to arrive now at an apparently
unresolvable dilemma suggests that Clayton
may indeed be right. Whether or not his ap-
proach could be successfully implemented
without slipping into "systematic synthesis"
is an issue that needs to be engaged, though I
cannot address it here.
Why has the search for criteria by which
to mount a critical theological appropriation
of science proven so difficult, the criteria so
elusive? In addition to Clayton's sugges-
tion of the need for a broader metaphysical
framework, I would like to conclude by
drawing attention to one other possibility.
Perhaps some clarity can be gained by re-
phrasing the concern. Instead of asking.
"What constitute adequate criteria for a criti-
cal appropriation of science?" one might ask,
"What would ensure the rationality of a theo-
logical decision to adopt or resist a particu-
lar scientific viewpoint?" As I have noted,
the central challenge for theology of nature
is to avoid either inappropriately resisting
science when it should be embraced, or in-
appropriately embracing science when it
ought to be resisted.
Wentzel van Huyssteen, in his discussion
of Harold Brown's treatment of rationality,
emphasizes the key role of judgment in all
human cognition and argues for the impossi-
bility of obtaining a guarantee or achieving
certainty when faced with the choices pre-
sented by the science dilemma. Although cri-
teria such as those being sought here may aid
in decision-making processes, a shift from a
rules-based understanding (or a criteriological
conception)**" of rationality to a judgment-
based understanding locates rationality
squarely within the agent who is making de-
cisions, rather than in the logical relations
between evidence and belief; such a shift
seems to preclude any neat resolution to the
science dilemma.**' In accordance with van
Huyssteen's view, Fraser Watts makes the fol-
lowing assessment:
[The search for and deployment ot"l
clear ground rules for evaluating how
well particular theological accounts and
scientific accounts sit alongside one
another... [will] be a mailer of judgment
rather than of strict logic, not unlike the
judgments scientists routinely make
about how well a particular scientific
theory sits with a body of data.**-
Clayton, too, seems to agree that the process
of judgment, which he defines as the forma-
tion of a "cognitive attitude," is ultimately
beyond the grasp of any rules-based rational-
ity.**' For these authors, the human person and
community emerge squarely at the center of
the decision-making process, whether in sci-
ence or theology. According to Calvin Sclirag,
what is needed, and in fact what an examina-
Uon of human rationality shows we have, is
the use of "criteria without criteriology."**"* In
light of this important insight into the nature
of human rationality, it would appear that any
set of criteria one might develop can play only
a supportive role as theology of nature seeks
to be informed by science.*'
Conclusion
As the need to include the accumulated
wisdom of science within theological patterns
and methods of reflection grows ever more
pressing, appropriate means must be devel-
oped for critically engaging scientific meth-
ods, concepts, and theories. The approach
identified in this paper, theology of nature,
with its interest in scientific methods and ac-
counts, its rich view of reality, its sense of
God's engagement with creation, and its in-
sistence on the significance of all creation for
God's purposes, is well suited to the challenge
of crafting a scientifically infomied view of
God, humanity, and the world.
Within this general approach, however, the
strategies of intelligibility and credibility rep-
resent two different impulses: one to make
sense of the world in which we live, and the
other to make sense of the God in whom we
live. These strategies stem from the same im-
pulse—a desire to make sense of the connec-
tion between God and Creation—but move
in opposite directions, one wanting to tether
theological thought to the world as it is known
through science, and the other wanting to ab-
stract lessons from science about human ra-
tionality to yield a more expansive view of
the rational resources available for theologi-
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cal reflection. In addition to adding a layer
of clarification to Barbour's typology, the
strategies of intelligibility and credibility pro-
vide a lens for understanding the related, but
distinct theological agendas of Peacocke and
Polkinghorne in their Gifford Lectures. The
difficulty of establishing criteria by which to
evaluate the merits of these strategies in rela-
tion to particular points of contact between
theology and science constitutes what I have
called the science dilemma for theology of
nature. Whether or not the central role ofjudg-
ment in the processes of human rationality
precludes any neat resolution to the dilemma
posed by these strategies is a question that
demands further investigation. Nonetheless,
in identifying these strategies and in pointing
to the unresolved nature of their relationship,
this paper has clarified theology's task as it
seeks to develop a robust view of God, hu-
manity, and the world in light of what is
known through science.
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65) in his discussion of the "transversal" na-
ture of rationality. Although the dynamism
implied by the word "dialectics" makes his
an apt characterization of the movement of
the rational agent's engagement with multiple
intellectual communities and discourses and
across disciplinary boundaries, I use the term
"dilemma" to signal my unwillingness to ac-
cept the lack of precision implied by the term
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78. Fraser Watts suggests one such possi-
bility, namely, that one is entitled to reject a
constraint if a particular scientific view in
question is deemed to be an unwarranted ex-
trapolation from the data; p. 177. In this case,
however, the science in question is bad sci-
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79. Clayton, op. cit., p. 8. His discussion
of a "presumption of naturalism" (pp. 173ff)
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approach toward the strategy of intelligibil-
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project of God and Contemporary Science as
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